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Travis E.Telford 23999
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
IN THE UTAH STATE SUPREME COURT
Travis E. Telford
Petitioner/Appellant

Case no. 20000807-SC
Priority no. 3

v.
Utah Bd. Of Pardons
Respondents/Appellee

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Jurisdiction and nature of proceedings
This is an appeal from the dismissal of petition filed in the Third
District Court.
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2 (3) (i) since the appellant is
serving a sentence from thefirst-degreefelony.
Statement of case
On March 12, 1994 the body of Troy Weston was discovered in a
ditch near Willard Bay, Box Elder County, Utah. Several days later the
(1)

police arrested the petitioner and charged him with Weston's murder,
Brandon Dahlquist, the co-defendant in this case was also arrested and
charged with the murder of Troy Weston.
Both defendants were arraigned and tried on the charge of murder a
First-degree felon, under § 76-5-203 (1995)U.C.A. Both defendants were
subsequently found guilty by a jury and sentenced to a period of 5 years to
life in the Utah State Prison. Both appealed their conviction.

The court of appeals affirmed the petitioners conviction State v.
Telford, 320 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah AP Ct 1997). The court of appeals
granted the co-defendant a new trial in which he was subsequently
aquatinted of the charge.
On May 27,1998 the petitioner was issued the pre-hearing packet that
contains all the information used by the Board of Pardons in the
determination of a projected release date. In this packet was the
recommendation of a 2000 re-hearing with a projected release date of March
27,2001 which reflects the sentence and release guidelines set forth by the
Utah Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice of 84 months. Also
included in this packet was the charge of contempt of court for refusing to
(2)

testify against the co-defendant at the new trial. On June 4, 1998 the
petitioner was taken to his original parole grant hearing. In this hearing, the
Board of Pardons and Parole hearing officer and victims parents
acknowledged that the petitioner was not the actual killer of the victim, but
by refusing to testify against the actual murder he had let the actual murder
go free. The case was put under advisement to be determined be the full
broad. In the subsequent staffing review it has determined that the petitioner
received re-hearing in 2018, some 206 months beyond the guidelines. The
Board of Pardons cited the refusal to testify at the co-defendants second trial
as an aggravating factor.
This matter was then submitted to the Third District Court under Rule
65 B(d* of the U.R.C.P. It was summarily dismissed on August 30, 2000
and is now being appealed.
Reasons for Granting Petition
Point One:
The Utah State Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded its
scope of authority bv taking on the role of a Judicial sentencing
entity which patently violates Article V Section I of the Utah
States Constitution and Article HI Section I of the United States
Constitution
(3)

The framers of the United States Constitution set up three separate
and distinct forms of government, the Executive, the Legislative, and the
Judicial branches of government, They vested each of these three forms of
government with certain powers. In the U.S. Constitution under Article III
Section I the Judicial branch of government was first described in the
formation of these three separate powers. The Judicial branch states the
following.
"The Judicial branch of the United States, shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the congress may
from time to time ordain and establish, the Judges both of the
Supreme and Inferior Courts. Shall hold their offices during
good behavior, and shall, at stated time, receive for their
services a compensation, which shall not diminish during their
continuance in office. " (Id U.S. Constitution)
In following in these footsteps the framers of the Utah State
Constitution set up the same three separate branches of government. They
described the duties of these branches of government and delegated their
powers in Article VI for the legislative, Article W for the executive, and

(4)

Article VIII for the Judicial. Theframersof the Utah State Constitution went
a step further than the U.S. Constitution by including Article V Section I into
the Utah State Constitution, [the separation of powers clause.] This
difference was so that the core powers or functions of the three branches of
government can only be utilized by a duly appointed officer of that division
of government. This was done to prevent the accumulation of all of these
powers into the hands of a few or many, which would be the ultimate
definition of a tyranny. In Article VIII the Judicial Branch of government is
defined in the Utah State Constitution, those who belong to the Judicial
Branch are clearly identified therein. These people vested with the power of
the Judiciary are the only people who can utilize the core Judicial Powers of
issuing final orders or imposing sentence. This was stated succinctly by the
Utah Supreme Court in Salt Lake City v. Ohms 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994)
the Ohms court stated as follows:
"Likewise a judge cannot appoint another person to enter final
judgements and orders or impose sentence. While he or she can
utilize referees, court commissioners, and other assistants for
various purposes, those persons cannot exercise that Judges
ultimate Judicial power for such if a non-delegable core judicial
(5)

function. In Courts of record, it is the Judge who is selected by
a precise constitutional procedure to exercise judicial power and
it is the Judge, not other "Quasi-Judicial" officers, who is
subject to the accountability provisions of the Utah State
Constitution." (Id at 848-849)
This was the determination by the Supreme Court when it revoked the power
to impose sentence, final judgements, and orders on criminal misdemeanor
matters in the State of Utah from court commissioners. As it said they are
not an Article VIII Judge and cannot do so under Article V Section I of the
Utah State Constitution. Therefore, clarifying that sentencing is a core
Judicial function and cannot be practiced by anyone other that an Article
Vm Judge.
However this is not the case on felony criminal matters that are
sentenced to the Utah State Prison, since Utah practices indeterminate
sentencing. Under this sentence scheme, it becomes the Utah State Board of
Pardons and Parole and not an Article VHI Judge who actually imposes the
sentence of imprisonment beyond the court imposed minimum. For it is the
Utah State Board of Pardons and Parole who applies the sentence and
release guidelines, and is therefore issuing the actual sentence of
(6)

imprisonment for the crime that was committed. This has previously been
acknowledged by the Utah State Supreme Court and Court of Appeals in the
Following precedents of Foote v. Utah Bd of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah
1991) the Foote court stated as follows:
"However, under the Utah indeterminate sentencing system, the
statute under which the defendant is convicted of for example a
first degree felony, sets the time of imprisonment as a range,
from 5 years to life. If the trial Judge sends the defendant to
prison, the Judge does not determine the number of years a
defendant will spend there. That is left to the unfettered
discretion of the Board of Pardons which performs a function
analogous to that of the trial Judge in jurisdiction that have a
determinate sentencing scheme." (Id)
See also Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons 870 P.2d 902,911-12 (Utah
19930
"To the extent that it is responsible for the application of the
[Sentencing] guidelines. The Board function as a sentencing
entity and decides the term of incarceration."

(7)

Accord Preece v. House 848 P.2d 163 (Utah ct app 1993) cert granted 853
P.2d 89 (Utah 1993):
"That the decision made by the Board of Pardons at an original
parole grant hearing as to the time to be served by a prison
inmate is inherently a sentencing function" (ID)
Therefore, it is clearly recognized by this States Supreme Court and
also the State Court of Appeals, that the Board of Pardons and Parole, being
a member of the executive branch of government set up under Article VII
Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution, is exercising the core Judicial
function of sentencing in the State of Utah. This is a direct violation of
Article V Section I of the Utah State Constitution, the separation of powers
clause. The reason for this unconstitutional delegation of power is the
statute, which empowers the Utah Board of pardons and Parole to make this
determination § 77-18-4 U.C.A.. which describes the indeterminate
sentencing practice.
At the District Court level of the action the State rebutted this
argument with the case of Padilla v. Utah Bd of Pardons and Parole 947 P.2d
664 (Utah 197) where the Supreme Court of Utah stated:

(8)

"Therefore, while the courts have the power to sentence, the Board
has been given the power to pardon and parole. These are two
separate and distinct powers, neither of which invades the province of
the other. Under our indeterminate sentencing scheme, a court must
set an indeterminate sentence as provided by statute. By its very term,
the "indeterminate" sentence shall continue until the maximum period
expires unless the Board, in its desecration, terminates or commutes
the punishment or pardons the offender." (Id at 669)
The fact that the Board, in applying the sentence and release
guidelines. Performs a function analogous to that of a Trial Judge in
jurisdictions with a determinate sentencing scheme, as pointed out in the
precedent of Foote, Preece. and Labrum. seems to have been set aside in
issuing the decision of Padilla.
It was the courts opinion that the Board of Pardons only exercises
their constitutionally granted powers to pardon and parole. If this is true, that
the Board is only practicing their constitutionally granted powers. Then the
sentencing Judge has, in effect, sentenced the defendant to a maximum
period of time allowable by statute. The court stated this fact in Padilla when
it stated:
(9)

"By its very term, the "indeterminate" sentence shall continue
until the maximum period expires unless the Board, in its
discretion, terminates or commutes the punishment or pardons
the offender." (Id at 669)
This practice, of issuing the maximum penalty in each and every case,
violates the right, granted to all persons in the United States by the 8^
Amendment to the United States Constitution that protects citizens form
cruel and unusual punishment, for as it has been stated by the United States
Court of Appeals in the case of United States v.Barker. 771 F.2d 1363
(1995):
"By routinely entering the maximum sentence without
differentiation among defendants, the District Court "failed to
abide by the implied congressional mandate to frame the
punishment to address the particular circumstances of the
individual defendants." (Id at 1367)
This does not happen in the State of Utah because all criminal defendants,
on felonies, sentenced to an indeterminate sentence, are sentenced to the
exact same sentence, with no merit given to the mitigating circumstances of
level of their culpability, by the sentencing Judge. For he is mandated
(10)

through the indeterminate sentencing scheme to issue a sentence that will
run to the maximum statutorily prescribed time, as stated in Padilla.
This practice of giving the maximum penalty in each and every case is
a blatant violation of Article I Section 9 of the Utah State constitution, for
not only does Article I Section 9 of the Utah State constitution guarantee the
same privileges as the 8th Amendment it includes an [unnecessary rigor]
clause that guarantees anyone in the Utah system of jurisprudence and it
cannot be contended that it is not very harsh or severe to impose the
maximum penalty without and consideration given to the mitigating factors
surrounding the crime and the criminal or taking into account the level of
culpability of the offender being sentenced"
Therefore, the decision in Padilla violates both the 8th Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Article I Section 9 of the Utah State
Constitution, and renders the statute § 77-18-4 U.C.A. that defines the
indeterminate sentencing practice in the State of Utah unconstitutional. The
practice of giving a mechanistic application of a given sentence to a given
category of crime should be stopped for it is unconstitutional.
Point 2:

(11)

The Utah Board of Pardons has exceeded the petitioners
sentence and release guidelines bv adding 206 months to his
sentence.
The petitioner was found to be in contempt of court by an admonishment by
the court during the October 1997 re-trial of the petitioners' co-defendant by
the Honorable Judge Ben Hadfield. This admonishment was a result of the
petitioners' invocation of his Fifth Amendment protections, in not giving
testimony in his co-defendants second trial in which he was subsequently
acquitted. The Honorable Judge Ben Hadfield stated that giving the
petitioner a fine or sentence was fruitless so he was therefore going to write
a letter to the Board of Pardons and Parole explaining the petitioners
reluctance to testify. The Honorable Judge Hadfield did not do this though
and there were never any formal charges filed against the petitioner.
The Board of Pardons and Parole has subsequently used this contempt
of court against the petitioner adversely against him in deciding his actual
term of imprisonment. In doing this the Board of Pardons and Parole has
taken on the roles of the Attorney General, the Article VIII Judge, the jury,
and the executioner of sentence in this matter. This is in direct conflict with
Article V Section I of the Utah State Constitution, the separation of powers

(12)

clause. Such a use of power by the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole is
plainly unconstitutional since, pursuant to Article VIP, only Judges, of
courts of record, may enter judgements and impose sentence in court of
record, since they are the only judicial officers constitutionally appointed to
perform such functions. Yet the Board of Pardons in determining the
petitioner actual term of imprisonment, re-sentenced the petitioner 206
months over and above his recommended release of 84 months. The reason
for exceeding the sentence and release guidelines stated by the Board of
Pardons n their rational for decision was the following:
"Court finding of contempt for refusal to testify at codefendants trial an aggravating factor."
By the utilization of the invocation of the petitioners Fifth
Amendment protections, he has been punished for doing what the law
permits. This is clearly unconstitutional see : U.S. v. Nichols937 F.2d 1257
(7th cir 199n:Blackledee v. Perry. 417 U.S. 21,40 l.Ed.2d 628, 94 Set 2094
(1974); U.S. v. Guthrie. 789 F.2d 356 (5th cir 1986) (For the government to
punish a person because he had done what the law plainly allows him to do
is a due-process violation of the most basic sort) The holdings from the
United States Supreme Court and other subsequent district courts makes it a
(13)

violation of due process to punish the petitioner for not giving testimony by
the invocation of his Constitution Rights. Their inherent rights in which
cannot be surgically removed through Legislative statute or administrative
rules are ones that extend into the construction of Magna Carta by Lord
Coke. The phrase "Due process of law" apparently originated in our judicial
parlance with Lord Coke who in construing the language of the Magna
Carta, "That no man shall be taken or imprisoned or deprived of life, liberty,
or property but by the judgement of his peers or the law of the land." said
that the "Law of the land" meant "due process of law", which definition is
the language used in our constitution. Many attempts have been made to
further define "due Process" but they all resolve in the thought that a party
shall have his day in court, with the privilege of being heard and introducing
evidence to establish his case or his defense, after which comes judgement
upon the record thus made. Says the standard definition: It "hears before it
condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgement only after trial."
The term "Law of the land" embraces all legal and equitable rules, which
define human rights and duties, and provides for their protection and
enforcement as between the state and its citizen, and between man and man.
And the "due process of law" includes the steps essential under such rules to
(14)

deprive a person of life or liberty. It covers the means of law. Jenkins v.
Ballantvne. Normally we think of "due process of law" as requiring judicial
action, but "due process" is not necessarily judicial action. , 8Utah 245, 30
P.760,16 L.RA 689 Normally we think of "due process of law" as requiring
judicial action, but "due process" is not necessarily a judicial action. People
v. Hasbrouck 11 Utah 291, 39P. 918: Ex parte Wall. 107 U.S. 265, 2 Sict
569, 27 L.Ed 52. In proper cases the purposes of the law may be officiated
by executive or administrative action. But all the methods and means
provided for the protection and enforcement of human rights whether
criminal, civil, or special proceedings have the same basic requirements, that
no party can be affected by such action, until his legal rights have been
subject of enquiry by a person or body that is authorized by law to determine
such rights. In depriving a person of life or liberty, the essentials of due
process are: (1) the existence of a competent person, body, or agency
authorized bv law to determine the questions (2) Inquiry into the merits of
the question bv such person, body or agency. (3) Notice to the person of the
inauguration and purpose of the inquiry. (4) The right to be heard in person
or bv counsel. (5) Fair opportunity to submit evidence, examine and crossexamine witnesses. (6) Judgement to be rendered upon the record.
(15)

Here stopping at the threshold of the inquiry (1) the existence of a
competent person, body, or agency [authorized by law] to determine the
questions. It is absolutely clear that the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole
does not have the authority to determine guilt or innocence of the contempt
of court admonishment by the Judge. More so the petitioner has never been
charged, tried, or convicted of contempt of court. Therefore, the board of
Pardons cannot use this factor in deciding the petitioners' sentence and to
exceed the sentence and release guidelines by 206 months. This action by a
member of the executive branch of government is in conflict with the Utah
State Constitution Article V Section L the separation of powers clause, since
sentencing is a core judicial function, (see Ohms, supra). Members of the
Executive Branch of government cannot exercise powers of the Judicial or
the Legislative branch. This doctrine has been defined in State v. Gallion
572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977) where the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"In this case the prohibition of Section I, is directed to a person
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to the
"executive department." The constitution further specifies in
Article VII, Section I, and the person of whom the executive
department shall consist. Thus it is the "persons" charged with
(16)

the exercise of the powers belonging to executive department,
who are prohibited from exercising, and functions appertaining
to the Legislative and Judicial departments." (Id at 687)
Conclusion
It is clear that by the application of the United States Constitution and
the Utah State Constitution which differs slightly adding a separation of
powers clause, disallows the delegation of the sentencing authority to
anyone other than a Article VIII Judge, for such is a core judicial function.
More so, mis State has previously held in both the Utah Supreme Court and
Utah Court of Appeals that the Board of Pardons and Parole is carrying out
the sentencing function by applying the sentence and release guidelines in
the State of Utah, which is a core judicial function. Since this State has
included the separation of powers clause, § 77-18-4 U.C.A. cannot authorize
the delegation of the sentencing power to the Board of Pardons. It is entirely
in conflict with the whole purpose of not only the formation of the three
powers of government, Judicial, Executive, and Legislative. It further makes
the separation of powers clause imbedded in the Utah State Constitution
meaningless. And, with the State arguing that criminal defendants are

(17)

actually sentenced to the maximum period of time allowable by statute
renders the cruel and unusual punishment and unnecessary rigor clauses
meaningless. The indeterminate sentencing scheme now utilized cannot
remain since everyone ever sentenced under it to date is serving an
unconstitutional and therefore illegal sentence.
The Utah Board of Pardons and Parole has been and continues to
exercise a judicial function not delegated to their branch of government, the
executive branch, This, as seen by precedent, and both the United States
Constitution and the Utah State Constitution. Point two elaborated the
inherent due process of both the court actions as well as the Board of
Pardons actions. There occurrences have violated the most basic principles
of jurisprudence, they cannot continue. The unconstitutionality of § 77-18-4
U.C.A. Utah sentencing statute is apparent and the practice of the Board
applying the sentence and release guidelines must be stopped. The Presentence Investigation Reports play the important role of determining the
amount of time to be served. The AP&P investigators are the best persons to
determine those issues. The Utah Board of Pardons and Parole takes the
position that the recommendation of the pre-sentence report is only that, a
recommendation, and they are not bound by it. How ever the sentencing
(18)

guidelines are not set to eliminate discretion but to bridle it. The purpose of
the Sentencing guidelines is as follows.
Purpose
These sentencing and release guidelines represent a cooperative effort, with imput by major components of the
criminal justice system to make a unified statement of policy
regarding the sentencing and release of criminal offenders. (1)
The underlying philosophy of the guidelines is that criminal
sentence should be proportionate to the seriousness of the
offence for which the offender is convicted Id Utah
Sentencing Guidelines training Manual Pg2
The Utah Board of Pardons is disregarding the sentencing guidelines
and they continue to be unbridled at their determination. It now seems to be
a completely unauthorized abuse of their authority since by law and Utah
constitution they simply do not have the authority to make these
determinations and neither the Legislature nor the sentencing Judge can
delegate it.

(19)

The petitioner should be issued a determinate sentence that complies
with the sentence and release guidelines that reflect his culpability and the
Court should order that the Board of Pardons have to discontinue the
practice of applying the sentence and release guidelines. If the only way that
this can be accomplished is to rule § 77-18-4 U.C.A. unconstitutional and a
determinate sentencing system that is constitutional adopted then this should
be done.
Respectfully submitted on this

day of

2000

Travis E.Telford #239999
Attorney pro se
County of Salt Lake

)

)ss
State of Utah

)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this

Notary Public

(20)

day of

2000

Exhibit A
Judgement and Commitment order

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT AND C
Plaintiff,
vs.
TRAVIS EDWARD TELFORD/

Case No. 941000

Defendant.

64rZg^l
On the 30th

day of May, 1995, appeared Jon J. Bunderson

Box Elder County Attorney representing the State of Utah/ and the
defendant appeared in person and represented by counsel/ Michael
D, Bouwhuis.
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant has been convicted by
his plea of guilty

X

a jury

the Court

of the offense (s) of: MURDER/ A FELONY THE 1ST DEGREE as charged;
and the Court having asked the defendant whether he has anything
to say why Judgment should not be pronounced/ and no sufficient
cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court/
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty as charged and
convicted, and/
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant is hereby
committed to the Utah State Prison and the Sheriff of Box Elder
County is directed to take him into custody and deliver him to

the Warden of the Utah State Prison to serve a term of Not less
than 5 years nor more than life with a consecutive enhancement of
not less than one nor more than five years for use of a firearm.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant pay restitution in
the amount of $23,072.00 ($6500.00 of that is joint and several
liability with the co-defendant).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the original of this Judgment and
Commitment shall be attested by the Clerk of the Court and that a
certified copy hereof be delivered to said Sheriff or other
qualified officer and that the copy serve as the Commitment of
the defendant and as the Warrant for the Sheriff in taking into
custody, detaining and delivering said defendant.
DATED this

"^Sf- day of

Mfiu

19*25 .

DISTRICT JUDGE
ATTEST:

CLERK, FIRST DISTRICT COURT
By Deputy Clerk

2

Exhibit B
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
State of Utah v Travis Telford
320 Vt. Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah App ct. 1997)

differently from the Federal constitution. We therefore limit
our analysis to the Federal Constitution. £££ State vl Wood. 868
P.2d 70, 90 n.4 (Utah 1993).
ANALYSIS

.I-c- Admissibility of Letters
Defendant
Fourth Ameffitoe,
outgoing
deniedf
that fax
actions'
underlying
correction^©
1033, 103%;

l a t , because j a i l o f f i c i a l s ^ v i p l a t e d h i s
tthen they inspected and- copied'ihis ,
" """ '•" r^the t r i a l c d u r j ^ ^ n ^ a s i y ^ i ^ :
|the l e t t e r s . J t t j i n *
£9M
i ^ F i r s t Americby||t
__;ourt • s" lega l^clfncDL
mdelr

&MmmMmgim&

iSra^Sfifi State v. McSratfcHfr3aft*& 2d

££&&£&, 251 U.S. 15,™ 40 S.; Ct. 50
In Stroll
(1919), , t h ^ ^ ^ e M s t a t e & - Supreme Court held that^the defendant's
Fourth Ame^dxnerPf right's were not violated by th'e^seTzure and
prosecutipn^s^jgse^of l e t t e r s the defendant had written in j a i l .
^ . v - — a t 52-53? see a l s o Hudson v. Palmer r
468 U.SZf^l^gmmfOA^S.
Ct. 3194, 3205 (1984)^("TTJhe Fourth
Amendment^has^iojapplicability t o a prison c e l l .~w)£|3; The Supreme
Court emphasiTe^hatlthe* o f f i c i a l s were" f oll6\irigl[the\
established|p^rfc3^6f'~the prison when they inspectedTthe l e t t e r s .
SSA SlU±ia?;2Sl^S/-at 21, 40 S, Ct. at 52-53/ Later, the
Supreme Courl^theld that, under the First Amendmentsprison
regulations restricting correspondence Mmust further an important
or substantial government interest•• and be no greater than is
necessary to protect the interest. Procunier v. Martinezf 416
U.S. 396, 413^94 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (1974), overruled on other
grounds. Thofnburah v, Abbott. 490 U.S. 401, 413-14, 109 S. Ct.
1874, 1882 (1989).~ Since Martinez, courts have limited Stroud's
Fourth Amendment holding to cases in which prison officials have
seized and inspected outgoing, nonprivileged letters Min the
exercise of legitimate government interests.11 United states v.
Whalen, 940_F.2d„1027,_1035 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing cases
limiting Stroud)•
Here, the jail policy governing outgoing mail provides that
mail will be winspected and scanned11 before delivery outside the
jail. Defendant concedes that he was on notice of this policy.
We conclude that the policy is narrowly tailored and serves
important-government interests by promoting discipline and
preventing criminal acts, &&£ People v. Whalin, 885 P.2d 293,
296 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); see also Whalen. 940 F.2d at 1035
(n[I3t is well established that prisons have sound reasons for

reading
the^oujtgoing mail of their inmates*w) • Iiffaddition,
H
[o]nce prison.,officials have a right to examine^suclf-messages,
no rule requires them to close their eyes to what: they discover
therein." State v. Jeffprs, 661 P.2d 1105, 1115-(Ariz. 19S3)•
Therefore, because jail officials did not violatejrdef endant fj5
Fourth Amendment rights by inspecting and copyingThis-.
nonpriviieged, outgoing mail, the trial court properly denied
defendantIs^mojtionato suppress the letters.
^^^^^ 5 * &M3Z
T u r n i r ^ t ^ ^ ^ ^ n d a n t f s F i r s t Amendment argfl||
thafe^jai^^^Mora^^did not deprive defendari r ^
co^fflpmd^^^^^j^censorship^or — — - ^ e t t e ^ ^ ^ p g f f l ^ M B S ^ L 2 d a t 296^ w Because
^
W^^^^^f^j^^^d^
ail^of f iciia
^^^^^ent^rightsi^^

note

[IjL Severance
:Defendani cwfESids-thaT tfie^trial^coifft^rPpi'c^l^^ehied
h ^ g ^ t i o n ^ t ^ ^ ^ ^ h c trial. He argues that^yggiefense, which
erqdMsizea ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ e f e n d a n t had pulled the trigge^^nd forced
dI*f^aant^€o^o^a*i1if^i6re ammunition, was 3 rreccShci^a'ble with the
arguments
of codefendant, who raised an alibi defense. Defendant
f
J ^ ^ P ^ r J ^ I ^ S * ^ e w a s Prejudiced by the-tri^fecpurt's denial
fipprovides that when a^defe^^^^^^-ejudiced
«,rs^*«-*.v,*v.« w ^ „ ^ *^-.*«t «„ juiticej*remiires%" Utah
Cd^Ann^fst7,7|L8a-l(4)(a) (1995). In interpretingjthis
provision",'~thefutah Supreme Court has held that' "(dfoubts
concerning prejudice should be resolved by the trial court in
favor of a" defendant." State v. Collins. 612 P.2d 775, 777 (Utah
1980). The supreme court has further stated that, although trial
courts "appear^.to be reluctant to grant severance,'* that
reluctance-"is^ill-advised and in the
long run'risks, greater
expenditure of.judicial resources.M State v. O'Brien. 721 P.2d
696, 898 (Utah 1986). Thus, if "joint defendants have defenses
that appear to be inconsistent with or to obstruct or impede each
other," trial courts must "carefully examine"
severance reguests
and "grant severance when there is any doubt-as~ to-prejudice."
Defendant argues that his defense was antagonistic and
irreconcilable with that of codefendant. "Antagonistic defenses
alohelare not sufficient to require a separate trial." State V,
itelarde. ,734 P.2d 440, 445 (Utah 1986). Rather, severance is
required only if :'*the defenses conflict to the point of being
Irreconcilable and'mutually exclusive." IiL. At trial, defendant
sfaued that codefendant shot Weston and ordered defendant to

.wzgflSXag^Ji:59 WmfJJtXW.

.r

-irr:cx:foF?lPPEALs.sa.,,,^p^

--.^ v«.^4iu£S^-.<«.

r e t r i e v e additional ammunition from the B l a z e r ,
codefendant,
however, denied that he was a t the scene when t h e shooting
occurred. Thus, the d e f e n s e s were mutually e x c l u s i v e : the jury
had t o r e j e c t one defense t o b e l i e v e t h e o t h e r . See s i l v a v.
££&£&;-" 933 S*W.2d 715, 719 (Tex. App. 1 9 9 6 ) ^ ; Under t h e s e
circumstances/ we agree with defendant t h a t ^ t h e t r i a l court erred
i i u r e f u s i n g t o sever the t r i a l .
_,^J~
Respite|the^error, however, we
I ^ e ^ ^ ^ ^ i f a nore
asdnafcly. 1 iXely
^ e s u l t f f o r defendant would . h a W g ^
L
f
i ^ t o i i i s , 748
severed ^the-1
:ehdarit
$lM»gg
^ P f e W a ^ ^ r e c l u d e d ; f r < S ^ :u ^ ^ p ^ ^ ® ^ ^ ^ j j f t g ^ »
iivel JafScnfTift^violation of i^the StxtK^aendmeni^g See i d .
kWlS9p9^(addressing;
raerxts
of argument i t h a t « r e f u ^ ^ 1 : o s e v e r
fc
"
"
"
ed*in
Si3ctli;:A»ehd»ent
e
r r o r ) ^ s e e ^ a l ^ H e r d g ^ K i n c h e l oe f
resi

8o6%^2<3 1526; 1529 (9th Cir. 1986)! (statinglthat,denial of
severance" may result in violation of confrontation rights).
•>**,?- I n particular, defendant contends that, had the trial court
severed the trial, his entire statement identifying,.codefendant
asXthe shooter would have been admissible through crosselwninationi of Detective Hansen. We have reviewed the unredacted
s^a^^^ntfF however, and conclude thlit^Tth^blaghi the ^statement
cjea^yj-implicates codefendant as the shooterf-xt-also
portrays
d^eh^nt^hiinself as an active participant^incathe murder*4 In
Contrast/.the unredacted statement contains rib exculpatory
evidence that might reasonably have led:the jury, to either acquit
defendant or?find him guilty,of a lesser included offense/
rherefore; w4 conclude that any constitutional error in excluding
tlie redacted portions was harmless. See Delaware v. Van Arsdallf
475 U.S. 673; 684, 106 S. Ct, 1431/ 1438 (1986) (concluding that
confrontation clause error is subject to harmless-beyond-areasonable-doubt standard).
4; The trial court commented on the unredacted statement as
follows:
[I]f the statement came in with no
redactions, it is in essence a confession
anyway. If the jury finds, as a matter of
fact, that defendant Telford went to the
vehicle, got more ammunition, brought the
clip~ back so that the shooting, or execution
at vthat.point, could Jae completed, then he
has -in effect confessed to being part and 1
parcel of that crime.
Defendants counsel agreed with this characterization, but argued
that th* jury might instead use the unredacted statement to
convir defendant of a lesser included off

J® QO?

Defendant further argues that,_if tried separately, he would
have been allowed to cross-e*xamine
Detective Hansen about other
exculpatory statements,5 The Utah Supreme Court has stated that
"we will not set aside a verdict because of the erroneous
exclusion of evidence unless a proffer of * evidence appears of
record.11 State v. Rammelr 721^P.2d 498, 499 (Utah 1986); fififi
flJLfiQ Utah R. Evid, 103 (a) (2JJ THere, the record does not reflect
that defendant informed the ^trial. court that further crossexamination of Detective Hanse«1[might reveal other exculpatory
statements giv^n by defenda^.^!£herefore# the "substance" of
$fiis particular
evidence^wa^
to the court," nor
Msjitlrfapparent from ^w|c^w^^^^^S^^h"ich questions were^f >
^ ^ M g t a h > . ^idm^^^^^^mmvl
ftrg^lleg,
921^
ft2^^g^^45^;(Utah""19^^^^^^^^^^^^^^>roof
to showjvhat
^iSence^oul1a-be^addu^^5^B^^5^^^^^^&ot"
address thelB||
f
G
mf^^S^ t^^^
a ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ l ^ , 921 P.2d at 445?

The trial court properly denied defendants motion to
suppress the letters he wrot» in-jail. Although the trial court
erred in refusing to seyer^the^ trial, ^that error, as well as any
resulting constitutional error*f^was* harmless• We therefore
cannot say that, had the^tri^l^court severed the trial, defendant

5. In support of this contention, defendant points to the
comments of counsel for codefendant at a preliminary hearing;
I figure we have 14 statements that this
defendant (TelfordJ
has made. The first one
goes from I wasnft there, but I think Brandon
did it, all the way to that Brandon pulled
the trigger and pointed the gun at me and
made me drag the body. He pointed the gun at
me and made me load it again so we could pump
more bullets into the body* • . .
• • • •

It is clear Mr* Telford is saying you made me
do it and you pointed a gun at me. That*s
what Mr. Telford's defense will be.

would have been reasonably likely to obtain a more favorable
result•
Defendants conviction is affirmed.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

MichUetfyJ. Wilkins,
Asspcxate Presiding Judge

Gregory &c Orme, Judge

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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BENCH, Judge:
Defendant Travis Telford was convicted of murder, a fiistdegree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1995). He appeals
his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred when it denied
his motion to suppress certain letters he wrote in jail. He also
argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to
sever the trial* We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On March 12, 1994, the body of Troy Weston was discovered in
a ditch near Willard Bay, Several days later, the police
arrested defendant and charged him with Weston's murder. Brandon
Dahlquist, the codefendant in this case, was also arrested and
charged with the murder.
While defendant was incarcerated on the murder cnarge, he
wrote several letters about the murder. After insp^tmg the
letters pursuant to jail policy, jail officials maJ; copies of
some of the
~rs and sent the copies to the co*
attorney.

Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the letters,
arguing that, by inspecting and copying the letters, jail
officials had violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights.
The trial court denied the motion, and, at trial, excerpts from
three of defendant's letters were read to the jury*
Soon after defendant's arrest, Detective David Hansen
escorted defendant to a police station in another city to
question him about an unrelated matter. On the way back to the
jail, defendant began talking to the detective about Weston's
murder• The detective's report of. defendant's statement is set
forth, in relevant part, below:
Travis{,] without being asked(,] just started
talking about the homicide of Troy Weston.
He said that Troy had inquired about buying a
gun from [codefendant] Brandon because he had
some people that wanted to hurt him. So he
said that he and Brandon went and picked up
Troy Weston at his house and headed out to
Willard to show him the gun.
He said that when he, Brandon Dahlquist, and
Troy arrived out in Willard, Brandon pulled
out a small automatic «22 cal. handgun. He
said that they had parked on the side of the
road to shoot. They then got out and went
over to shoot the gun and Troy asked how did
it work.
Travis said that when Troy asked if it
worked, Brandon then said, "I'll show you how
it works." He then said that Brandon then
pointed the gun at Troy and shot him in the
shoulder. He said Troy screamed and said
what are you doing? He then said Brandon
then shot him again, this time twice in the
back because Troy then had shifted sideways.
He then said that Troy continued to yell for
him to stop it. He then said one of the
bullets must have hit Troy's spine because he
quit moving and just dropped to the ground.
Brandon then shot him again twice more in the
front and the gun jammed. Brandon then tcld
Travis to go to the Blazer and get another
clip so Travis ran to the Blazer and got
another clip.
He the\
Bias-

said when he got back from the
^randon loaded the new clip and
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placed the gun under Troy's chin and pulled
the trigger one last time. He then said Troy
did not move anymore and Brandon told him to
drag the body about 3 0 feet to a ditch. He
then said they got back in the Blazer and
sped back to Ogden.
Over the objections of both defendants, the trial court
allowed Detective Hansen to read a redacted version of
defendant's statement to the jury. To protect codefendantfs
confrontation rights, the trial court had ordered that the
statement be redacted to omit any reference to Dahlquist.1
1. The redacted statement# as read to the jury, appears in the
transcript, in relevant part, as follows:
Travis, without being asked, started to
talk about the homicide of Troy Weston. He
said that Troy had inquired about buying a
gun because he had some people who wanted to
hurt him. He said he went and picked up Troy
Weston at his house and headed out to Willard
to show him the gun.
He said that when he and Troy arrived
out in Willard out came a small automatic .22
caliber handgun. He said that they had
parked on the side of the road to shoot.
They then got out and went over to shoot the
gun and Troy asked how did it work- Travis
said that when Troy asked if it worked, he
was shot in the shoulder. He said Troy
screamed and said what are you doing- Troy
then was shot again. This time twice in the
back, because Troy's body had then shifted
sideways.
He then said Troy continued to yell to
stop it. He then said that one of the
bullets must have hit Troy's spine because he
quit moving and just dropped to the ground*
Troy was then shot again twice more in the
front and the gun jammed. He said it either
jammed or ran out of ammunition- Travis vent
back to the Blazer and got another clip.
When he got back to the Blazer the new clip
was loaded and the gun was placed under
Troy's chin and the trigger pulled one last
time. He then said Troy did not move any
more and he dragged the body about 30 feet tc
the dit^1
He then got back to the Blazer
(o~

led. . .)
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Defendant had argued that admission of the redacted statement
would force him to testify, in violation of his Fifth Amendment
rights, because it falsely implied that he had pulled the
trigger- Although the redacted statement was admitted into
evidence, defendant never testified.
Defendant also argued that, under his Sixth Amendment right
to confront witnesses, he should be permitted to ask Detective
Hansen on cross-examination whether the statement, as read to the
jury, was a complete representation of what defendant had told
him. Defendant contended that the- redacted portions of his
statement are exculpatory andf that further cross-examination of
the detective might reveal additional exculpatory evidence. The
trial court d-Ld not allow defendant to ask Detective Hansen about
any redacted matters or to refer to codefendant in any way.
During a pretrial hearing, and again at trial, defendant
requested that he and codefendant be tried separately. The trial
court, however, refused to sever the trial. The jury convicted
both defendants of murder.2
On appeal, defendant argues that jail officials violated his
First and Fourth Amendment rights by inspecting and copying the
letters he wrote in jail. He therefore contends that the trial
court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the letters. He
also argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion% to
sever the trial and that he was prejudiced by the trial court &
refusal to sever. As evidence of prejudice, he argues that the
trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by precluding him
from fully cross-examining Detective Hans€>n.3
Defendant cites analogous provisions of the Utah
Constitution to support his arguments. He fails, however, to
explain how the Utah Constitution should be interpreted
1.

(..•continued)
and sped back to ogden.
(Quotation marks omitted,)

2. This court reversed codefendant1 s conviction on the ground
that his Miranda rights were violated during police
interrogation. fi£S State v, Dahlquist, 931 P.2d 862 f 868 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997) •
3. Defendant also contends that the trial court violated his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. We declir. j to
address defendants F''"* ** Amendment argument, however, bee- * he
has failed to cite ar^hority to support his contentior;e£
fi+^frfl v- Bishop. 75?
'19, 450 (Utah 1988).

@(M)

Exhibit C
Transcript of Travis Telford at the re-trial of co-defendant
Brandon Dahlquist
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

3

BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

4

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

5
6
7
8

Case No. 941000043

vs.
BRANDON A. DAHLQUIST,
Defendant

9
10
11

Transcript of Travis Telford's Examination
Honorable Ben H. Hadfield presiding.
First District Court Courthouse
Brigham City, Utah
September 27, 1997

12
13
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14
For the Plaintiff:

JON J. BUNDERSON
County Attorney
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KENT SNIDER
Attorney at Law
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17
18
19
20
21
22
23
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RODNEY M. FELSHAW
Registered Professional Reporter
First District Court
P. O. Box 873
Brigham City, UT 84302-0873

1
2
3

MR. BUNDERSON:

At this point, if it's agreeable with

the court, I'd like to call Travis Telford to the stand.
THE COURT:

Okay.

4

TRAVIS TELFORD,

5

called as a witness, being first duly sworn to tell the

6

truth, was examined and testified as follows:

7
8
9

MR. BUNDERSON:

Do I have permission to proceed with

him as a hostile witness?
MR. SNIDER:

At this point I don't know if there's a

10

foundation to do so.

11

THE COURT:

I'll take judicial notice of the fact that

12

Mr. Bunderson was the prosecutor that obtained a conviction

13

on this defendant, which, in the court's view, would

14

suffice for a hostile witness.

15
16

MR. BUNDERSON:
Christmas card list.

17
18

As I told the jury, I'm not on his

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BUNDERSON:

19

Q.

Your name is Travis Telford, is that correct?

20

A.

Yeah.

21

Q.

You are a co-defendant in this matter, is that

22

correct, or you were a co-defendant in this matter?

23

A.

I'm going to take the Fifth on everything.

24

Q.

Have you previously been convicted of the murder

25

of Troy Weston occurring on March 12th, 1994?

if

A.

I'm taking the Fifth on everything, Mr.

2

Bunderson.

I've got pending legal action.

Therefore, I

3

can't answer any of your questions, because it might be

4

held against me in my trial.

5

Q.

Describe your pending legal action?

6

A.

Habeus corpus.

7

habeus.

8

Q.

Is there any direct --

9

A.

I'm in the process of filing it right now.

10

Q.

Who is?

11

A.

I am.

12

I have one year to file my

I have to do it myself because I'm

indigent.

13

Q.

But it is a habeus petition?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Are you planning to file that in state court?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

Okay.

18
19

But your direct appeals are all concluded,

is that correct?
A.

Yes, because I wasn't informed by the lawyer that

20

you appointed me that I had 30 days to refile on my last

21

appeal denied.

22

Q.

I didn't appoint him, please understand that.

23

The State did, or the judge did.

Anyway, you understand

24

that you appealed your conviction and the conviction was

25

upheld and the remittitur has come back to this court, is

1

that your understanding?

2

MS. BRIDGESS:

3

THE COURT:

4

Bridgess.

May I have a moment, Your Honor?

Mr. Telford, this is Attorney Candace

She's a public defender that works here.

5

MR. TELFORD:

6

MS. BRIDGESS:

Yes.

I spoke to her downstairs.

We did speak downstairs.

I need to put

7

on the record that I did explain to Mr. Telford that prior

8

to me passing the Bar that I worked for Mr. Snider as a law

9

clerk and I assisted him on the Brandon Dahlquist case.

He

10

understands that and I believe will waive any conflict that

11

I might have.

12

MR. TELFORD:

Yeah.

13

not saying nothing.

14

THE COURT:

I'm just pleading the Fifth and

Mr. Telford, because there are no pending

15

criminal charges against you, you do not at this point have

16

the right to appointed counsel.

17

appoint her.

18

with her as a convenience or courtesy as you may choose.

I'm not going to formally

We're making her available for you to consult

19

MR. TELFORD:

20

THE COURT:

Yeah.

But you aren't entitled to appointed

21

counsel because right now you are not charged with

22

anything.

23

MR. TELFORD:

24

THE COURT:

25

I understand.

Do you want to visit with her for a moment

before going any further?

1

MR. TELFORD: Yeah.

2

THE COURT: All right.

3

Just visit right there.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

4

THE COURT: Mr. Bunderson, you may proceed.

5

MR. BUNDERSON:

6

Q.

Thank you.

(BY MR. BUNDERSON)

Mr. Telford, at this point

7

I'm just trying to establish the current status of your

8

legal proceedings.

9

potential habeus writ?

10

A.

Is there anything pending other than a

Under Rule 35 I was -- I had the right to be

11

informed by my attorney as to having a rehearing on the

12

denial of my appeal.

13

therefore am requesting to file my habeus.

14

Q.

I was not informed about that, so I

I understand that.

My question is, is there

15

anything pending to your knowledge other than the habeus

16

petition?

17

A.

I don't know.

19

Q.

No, not other than what we've already done.

20

A.

Nothing that I know of, then.

21

MR. BUNDERSON:

18

You got any other charges on me

now?

Okay.

I think the record would

22

reflect, Your Honor, that the remittitur was sent back and

23

I believe the status of the law is that any defendant,

24

within certain time frames, always has rights -- the right

25

to file a habeus writ; but as far as direct appeals are

1

concerned, I believe his direct appeals are fully

2

concluded.

3

THE COURT:

It's the court's understanding from

4

visiting with counsel, and Mr. Snider, correct me if I'm

5

wrong, but I believe you each have reviewed Mr. Telford's

6

I criminal file and are satisfied that the time for any

7

appeals on the criminal conviction have long since expired,

8

is that correct?

9

MR. SNIDER:

That is correct, Judge.

10

MR. BUNDERSON:

11

MS. BRIDGESS:

12

That's my understanding also.
As of last week, when I spoke with the

clerk of the Supreme Court, that is also my understanding.

13

THE COURT:

14

Q.

Go ahead.

(BY MR. BUNDERSON)

Mr. Telford, if the court

15

informs you that you do not have a Fifth Amendment

16

privilege --

17

A.

Then I get contempt.

18

Q.

So your position --

19

A.

The place I live at I cannot testify.

So what?

20

testify it puts my life in danger.

21

anything.

I'm not going to say

I'm just going to sit here and do nothing.

22

Q.

All right.

23

A.

You ain't going to get no answers.

24

Q.

I'm getting some talking at this point.

25

If I

me ask you this.

Now, let

If I were to ask you anything about your

1
2

j relationship with Dahlquist and what happened with Mr.
Weston, you would refuse to say anything?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

If I ask you if you wrote a particular letter and

5

showed you a copy of that letter, would you confirm if you

6

had indeed written the letter?

7
8
9

A.

I won't answer no questions.

That would be a

question and I won't answer any questions.
Q.

If I were to ask you whether you had given any

10

statements to police officers involved in this matter, are

11

you going to just not respond to me?

12

A.

No response.

13

Q.

All right.

Particularly a statement you gave to

14

a Detective Hansen, if I asked you about that on a

15

particular date, are you just going to say no response?

16
17
18
19

A.

I might use a few expletives to describe the guy.

I'm not going to answer anything, no.
Q.

You are not willing to discuss what you talked

with him about?

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

Would the same apply to statements that were

22

given to Detectives Ward and Summerill?

23

A.

Yeah.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

And if the judge were to hold you in

contempt for your failure to answer questions, your

1
2
3
4

response is that so what, what can you do to me?
A.

Do you want them concurrent or consecutive with a

five to life?
MR. BUNDERSON:

Okay.

I believe that would establish

5

the situation, Your Honor.

6

point of allowing us to establish that his prior statements

7

are reliable and that we could use those.

8
9

THE COURT:

I think that puts us at this

Before we address that issue, Mr. Telford,

let me advise you of a couple of things for the record. I

10

think I understand full well what you're saying.

11

mentioned the place where you live and I understand where

12

that is.

13
14
15

MR. TELFORD:

You

I've already gotten in a few fights down

there over this whole matter.
THE COURT:

All right.

You are in the custody of the

16

Department of Corrections.

17

doesnft have any control over you.

18

MR. TELFORD:

19

THE COURT:

This court at this point

I understand that.

However, in a serious trial such as this

20

one, the court has an interest in getting at the truth of

21

what occurred.

22

charges against you, you no longer have a Fifth Amendment

23

right against self-incrimination.

24

apply to you at this time.

25

Because there are no pending criminal

That right does not

I am ordering you to respond to Mr. Bunderson's

1

questions. Now# if you refuse, I will hold you in

2

contempt.

3

don't pose near as much a threat to you as perhaps some

4

other individuals.

I understand that you are of the opinion that I

5

MR. TELFORD:

6

THE COURT:

Yeah, the people I live with.

On the other hand, you need to understand

7

that I take these proceedings very seriously.

8

refuse and I hold you in contempt, it is my intention that

9

If you

I I will write to the Board of Pardons and indicate to them

10

your refusal to follow my order and your contempt.

11

don't know what they will do with it, but you understand

12

J that your fate is in their hands?

13

MR. TELFORD: Yeah.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. TELFORD:

If you get out -I understand.

Whether I testify or not,

16

it ain't going to affect the Board one bit.

17

hold it against me if I don't.

18

Now, I

THE COURT:

They might

It won't help if I do.

I don't know whether it will or not.

19

telling you that I will send them a letter and indicate

20

your refusal to follow a lawful court order.

21

MR. TELFORD: Okay.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. TELFORD: Yeah.

24

THE COURT:

25

Do you understand that?

Do you want to visit with Ms. Bridgess

anymore before we go on?

I'm

MR. TELFORD: No.
2

THE COURT:

If you do, I'll allow it.

3

MR. TELFORD:

4

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Bunderson.

5

MR. BUNDERSON:

I don't think so.

Your Honor, at this point I think

6

we've established Mr. Telford's attitude and it doesn't

7

appear that we'll get anything out of him in the form of

8

testimony either now, here, or in front of the jury.

9

the extent it might be necessary, I'd like to ask the court

To

10

to keep him in one of the local jails for a few more days,

11

then have him go back to the prison.

12

MR. TELFORD:

13

me.

14

taken.

15
16

You ain't going to get no answers from

You might as well send me home so my stuff isn't
It's not like I live with a high class of people.

MR. BUNDERSON:
on tomorrow.

17

MR. TELFORD:

18

MR. BUNDERSON:

19

If you want to testify we can put you

No, I'm not going to testify.
I'd ask the court to do that.

know that he needs to be in here for any of the arguments.

20

MR. TELFORD:

21

THE COURT:

Send me home.

Mr. Telford, I'll give you one last

22

opportunity.

23

to the questions that are asked?

24
25

I don't

Are you going to follow my order and respond

MR. TELFORD:
Honor.

I'm going to have to decline that, Your

1

THE COURT: All right.

The court formally holds this

2

defendant in contempt.

The sanction I will impose under

3

the circumstances is that I intend to write a letter to the

4

Board of Pardons and explain to them these proceedings and

5

the defendant's refusal to comply with the court's order.

6

Beyond that it is up to them if they do anything or not.

7

MR. TELFORD: All right. Your Honor.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. SNIDER:

10
11
12

Before you do I would like to ask some

questions.
THE COURT: All right.

If he's refusing to answer

questions I'm not sure how far you can get.

13
14

I will excuse you at this time.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SNIDER:

15

Q.

You and I spoke in the prison?

16

A.

Yeah.

17

Q.

And before you and I talked -- well, Ted Selick

18

was there?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Okay.

21

A.

23

THE COURT:

25

It was at the Oquirrhs.
And before you and I spoke at the

Oquirrhs, Ted and you spoke at the Oquirrhs, correct?

22

24

About two weeks ago.

Yes.
For the record, can you clarify who Ted

Selick is?
MR. SNIDER:

A paralegal that works for me on this

1

case.

2

Q.

3

(3Y MR. SNIDER)

Ted identified himself as a

paralegal working for me on this case?

4

A.

Yes.

5

|

Q.

A nice guy?

6

J

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Kind of the same hair line as yours?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Okay.

But he doesnft do it willingly.
You made a lot of statements to the cops

10

when they arrested you and wrote a bunch of letters and

11

stuff, correct?

12

A.

I have no response.

13

Q.

Okay.

It would be fair to say that if any of

14

them were called, they would testify you talked to them,

15

correct?

16

A.

Yeah; but not necessarily the truth.

17

Q.

Okay.

18
19
20

That's my question.

the truth or were you jacking them around?
A.

I told them, when they interviewed me, I said if

Ifm lying, so what.

21

MR. SNIDER:

22

THE COURT:

Thank you. No other questions.
Anything further, Mr. Bunderson?

23
24

25

Did you tell the cops

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BUNDERSON:

Q.

At what point did you tell them the truth?

1
2
3

A.

I haven't told nobody nothing except a bunch of

lies.
Q.

You told Detective Ward and Detective Summerill

4

different stories on at least two different occasions, is

5

that right?

6

A,

I don't know,

7

Q.

And were those --

8

A.

It's been a long time ago.

9

Q.

Were those true?

10

A.

I don't know.

11

Q.

Were any of the untruths for the purpose of

I can't recollect.

I can't recollect.

12

avoiding criminal liability or responsibility?

13

words, saying like I didn't do it?

14

A.

15

MR. BUNDERSON:

16

THE COURT:

In other

I'm not going to answer that question.
Okay.

Thank you.

The witness is excused at this time.

I'll

17

direct that he be held here in the local facility until

18

such time as it's determined that he will not possibly be

19

needed.

20

MS. BRIDGESS:

21

THE COURT: Yes.

22
23
24
25

May I approach for a moment?

(Discussion at the bench, not reported.)
THE COURT:

At this time the court will excuse

attorney Candace Bridgess. Go ahead, counsel.
(Trial continued, not transcribed.)

C E R T I F I C A T E
2
3
4

j STATE OF UTAH

)
:
| COUNTY OF BOX ELDER)

SS

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the jury trial proceed-

5

ings were transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified

6

Court Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of

7

Utah, residing at Brigham City, Utah.

8
9
10
11

That a full, true and correct transcription of
Mr. Travis Telford's examination at trial is set forth in
the pages numbered 2 to 14, inclusive.
I further certify that the original transcript

12

was filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Box

13

Elder County, Brigham City, Utah.

14

I also certify that I am not associated with any

15

of the parties to said matter and that I am not interested

16

in the event thereof.

17
18

Witness my hand and Notarial Seal this 1st day
of June, 1998.

Exhibit D
Board of Pardons hearing worksheet

BOARD OF PARDONS
05/26/98 12:00 PM
OBSCIS: 00082670

KLR Page: 3
Hearing Worksheet
NAME: TELFORD, TRAVIS EDWARD

USP: 23999

OBSCIS: 00082670 USP: 23999
HEARING DATE: 06/04/1998TIME SERVED: 50
TOTAL RESTITUTION:
23072.00
TOTAL FINES:
0.00
EARLIEST COMMITMENT:
TOTAL CREDIT DAYS:
425
COMPUTATION DATE:
03/31/1994
FINAL EXPIRATION DATE:
LIFE
GUIDELINE MONTHS:
84
GUIDELINE PAROLE DATE: 03/27/2001
RISK SCORE
8 Moderate

Exhibit E
Time Matrix worksheet
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24 MON
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30MON

21 MON

21 MON
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8 MON
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6 MON

1
10YRS

c
o

MODERATE

n
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l
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4 MON
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1

18MON I 12 MON 112 MON

6 MON

3 MON

3 MON

1

6 MON
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| 3 MON
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I

EXCELLENT

r-j
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OTHER
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I

OTHER

TOTAL
SENTENCES SHOULD GENERALLY BE CONCURRENT. HOWEVER THE EXISTENCE
OF THE FOLLOWING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES SUGGEST CONSIDERATION
OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES:
1. ESCAPE OR FUGITIVE
2. UNDER SUPERVISION OR BAIL RELEASE WHEN OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED
3. UNUSUAL VICTIM VUNERABIUTY
4. INJURY TO PERSON OR PROPERTY LOSS WAS EXTREME FOR CRIME CATEGORY
5. OFFENSE CHARACTERIZED BY EXTREME CRUELTY OR OEPRAVITY
IF THE SENTENCES ARE TO BE CONSECUTIVE. USE THE CONSECUTIVE ENCHANEMENTS
PORTION OF THE 'TIME MATRIX' FOR ALL CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES EXCEPT THE
-MOST SERIOUS" CONVICTION.
Fona U

J±

Exhibit F
Board of Pardons, Rationale for decision worksheet
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Exhibit G
Letterfromhearing officer Maarice Escobar

State of Utah
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE
Michael O. Lea vitt
Governor
Michael R. Sibbett
Chairman
Donald E. B l a n c h a r d
C u r t i s L. G a r n e r
Cheryl Hansen
Keith N. Hamilton
Members

448 East 6400 South-Suite 300
Murray, Utah 84107
Tel (801) 261-6464
Fax (801) 261-6481

August 11, 1999

Travis E Telford USP# 23999
Utah State Prison U4- 510
Draper, Utah 84020
RE-Travis Telford
USP# 23999
Dear Mr. Telford:
The Board of Pardons received your correspondence and it has been
forwarded to me for a response. I have searched our records and find no
documentation of you having asked your present questions of the Board before, as
stated in your letter to Chief Justice Richard Howe.
A 5 to Life sentence, in the state of Utah' indeterminate sentencing system, means
you may serve a minimum of five years which may also be for life, in other words you
will not expirate your sentence and the Board retains jurisdiction over your case for
life. The Board of Pardons may grant a termination of sentence or it may grant a
parole date or it may choose to keep you in prison for the rest of your natural life.
Regarding your question of concurrent or consecutive sentences, you have only one
sentence, therefore neither apply in your case. It only applies when there are more
than one and if a sentence is concurrent to another, it means both times are to be
served at the same time. If a sentence is consecutive to another, it means one
sentence has to be served before the other can begin. In this case (consecutive), the
sum of all sentences can not exceed 30 years, normally for offenses of a lesser
degree that in your case.
The Board received another letter from you requesting explanation to the following
issues: Regarding the check marks in the rational for decision form, they are self
explanatory, where there is aggravation a check mark is done and where there is no
mitigation no check mark is done and viceversa.
You ask "how the defiance of authority was determined?". Even though the court
understood your reservations of testifying against your co-defendant it found you

guilty of Contempt for your refused. At your Original Hearing, you told the Board
member "I should have testified, and it's something I should have done, but I can't
change something I have already done, I just have to deal with the problems that I've
caused and what's happened". The Board member told you the Board was going to
factor your unwilligness and reticence on your part, at that point in time,into their
decision with regard to you and your sentence overall.
Regarding your question of "what a staffing review entails". That is when your case
was reviewed by the full Board after your Original Hearing and a decision was made
regarding your case. You were told by the Board Member at your Original Hearing,
he was going to present your case to them for review and decision.
The information used in the decision was all information submitted to the Court and
the Board regarding your case including police investigation reports, presentence
reports etc., all information in yourfilewas disclosed to you as acknowlegded by your
signature of May 27,1998.
The Matrix and guidelines is a tool that "suggest" the amount of time a person could
serve. The Courts and the Board are not bound to follow the guidelines, as noted

before, Ittevised pnly q? q gwfeline.
The Board can consider recommendations from other agencies such as the courts
and the prison, however it is not bound to follow their recommendations.
In the rational for a decision, the Board determined " a weapon was used in the
commitment of the crime", It's not saying you used the weapon. It has been
acknowledged you were not the person who actually used the weapon, however the
Sentencing Court determined you were equally guilty of the crime.
As for the misdeaminor offense of Contempt it was not configured in the matrix. The
only cime included was Murder,a First Degree Felony.
Regarding your request for an inmmediate hearing or review, the Board will not
consider any change to a Board ordered parole, review,rehearing date or conditions
of parole without the express requestfroman assigned Case Worker, Case Manager,
Treatment Team, Institutional Parole Officer or Parole Officer,etc. You should
communicate with the appropiate channels at the institution.
Sincere]
scobar
He<fring Officer

Exhibit H
Order of The Honorable Judge L. A. Dever

SHAREL S. REBER (#7966)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (#1231)
Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
P.O. Box 140857
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Telephone: (801) 366-0353
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TRAVIS EDWARD TELFORD,

ORDER

Petitioner,
vs.
BOARD OF PARDONS,
Respondent.

Case No. 000900955
Judge L.A. DEVER

Having carefully reviewed all the pleadings submitted by both parities, being fully
advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, and based on the following:
1.

Pursuant to prevailing Utah law, "the [Utah Board of Pardons and Parole's]
exercise of its parole powers in setting determinate parole dates does not violate
the separation of powers doctrine." Padilla v. Utah Board ofPardons and Parole,
947 P.2d 664,669 (Utah 1997).

2.

The Board's imposition of a parole date in excess of the state's sentencing
guidelines does not violate substantive nor procedural due process rights, "[S]o
long as the period of incarceration decided by the Board of Pardons falls within an
inmate's applicable indeterminate range, then absent unusual circumstances, that
decision cannot be arbitrary or capricious-" Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508,512
(Utah 1994).

3.

The Board has aright<4to rely on any factors known . . . or later adduced . . . in
deciding whether [a prospective probationer] pose[s] a societal

risk

Northern

v. Barnes, 825 P.2d 696,699 (Utah App. 1992) <#V/870 P.2d 914 (Utah 1993).
4.

Moreover, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77 -27-5(3), "[d]ecisions of the Board of
Pardons in cases involving paroles, pardons, commutations or termination of
sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are final and are not
subject to judicial review."

Therefore, IT IS ORDERED:
1.

The Utah Board of Pardons and Parole (Board) has not exceeded the scope of its
authority by setting Petitioner's parole date in the year 2018. The Board's
imposition of this date does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, nor
does it violate Petitioner's substantive or procedural due processrights,where, as
here, this date falls within the applicable range of incarceration for the crime

2

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced.
The Board's consideration of Petitioner's unwillingness to testify at his codefendant's trial as a factor in determining Petitioner's parole date, is not subject
to judicial review.
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is granted, dismissing Petitioner's Petition with
prejudice.

DATED this

day of September 2000.

L.A. DEVER
District Court Judge

3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, postage prepaid,
on this r

day of September 2000 to the following:

Travis E. Telford
Inmate #23999
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
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